A new attack against a novel certificateless aggregate signature scheme with constant pairing computations is presented. To enhance security, a new certificateless signature scheme is proposed first. Then a new certificateless aggregate signature scheme with constant pairing computations based on the new certificateless signature scheme is presented. Security analysis shows that the proposed certificateless aggregate signature scheme is provably secured in the random oracle.
Introduction
The concept of aggregate signature (AS) scheme was first introduced by Boneh et al. [1] in 2003. Such a scheme greatly reduces the computational and communication overhead since it could aggregate signatures on distinct messages from distinct users into a single signature and check the correctness through a verification operation. The AS scheme is very useful in real-world applications. For example, in the scenario of the secure Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [2] , each router successively signs its own segment of a path in the network and then forwards the collection of signatures associated with the path to the next router. The AS scheme can be used to compress these signatures into a single one and hence reduce the overheads of both bandwidth and computation required in the original secure BGP. Similarly, in the scenario of the Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) [3] , each vehicle or roadside unit (RSU) has to verify around 500-2000 messages per second. The AS scheme can be used to compress these messages into a single one and check the correctness through a verification operation. To satisfy different applications, many AS schemes based on the traditional public key cryptography (TPKC) and identitybased public key cryptography (ID-based PKC) have been proposed.
It is well known that a certificate, generated by a trusted third party, is needed to bind a user's identity and its public key in the TPKC. However, the management of these certificates becomes more and more difficult with the growth of users' number. To solve the problem, Shamir [4] introduced the concept of the ID-based PKC. In such cryptography, the user's identity, such as name, email address, and telephone number, is his public key and his private key is generated by the key generation centre (KGC) using his identity. However, the key escrow problem exists in the ID-based PKC since the KGC know the user's private key. In 2003, Al-Riyami and Paterson [5] developed the concept of the CLPKC to solve the key escrow problem in the ID-PKC. In CLPKC, the KGC only generates a partial private key for a user and the full private key of the user is a combination of his partial private key and some secret value chosen by the user himself. Recently, CLPKC attracted much attention and many certificateless encryption (CLE) schemes [6] [7] [8] , certificateless key agreement (CLKA) schemes [9] [10] [11] , certificateless signcryption (CLSC) schemes [12, 13] , and certificateless signature (CLS) schemes [14] [15] [16] were proposed.
To satisfy the applications in certificateless environment, the certificateless aggregate signature (CLAS) scheme has attracted much attention. Several CLAS schemes [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] have been proposed by different researchers. However, most of 2 The Scientific World Journal these schemes [17] [18] [19] [20] 23] have computational complexity for pairing computations that grows linearly with the number of signers, which deviates from the main goals of aggregate signatures. Besides, both of the schemes [20, 22] of Zhang et al. require certain synchronization; that is, all signers must share the same synchronized clocks to generate aggregate signature. It is easy to say that it is difficult to achieve synchronization in many communication scenarios. Shim [24] pointed out that L. Zhang and F. Zhang's scheme [20] is vulnerable to the coalition attack. Xiong et al. [25] found that Hu et al. 's scheme [21] cannot provide unforgeability. Very recently, Xiong et al. [25] proposed a certificateless signature (CLS) scheme and constructed a new CLAS scheme using that CLS scheme. Compared to previous CLAS schemes, Xiong et al. 's CLAS scheme is very efficient in computation, and the verification procedure needs only a very small constant number of pairing operations, independent of the number of aggregated signatures. Besides, their scheme does not require synchronization for aggregating randomness. Unfortunately, He et al. [26] pointed out that Xiong et al. 's CLAS scheme is insecure against a Type II adversary by giving concrete attack. However, He et al. did not give countermeasure to enhance security. In this paper, we propose a new attack against Xiong et al. 's CLAS scheme; that is, a Type II adversary could forge legal signature for any message. To improve security, we also propose an improved CLAS scheme.
The organization of the paper is sketched as follows. Section 2 gives some preliminaries of the paper. Sections 3 and 4 review and analyze Xiong et al. 's scheme. Section 5 gives our improved scheme. Sections 6 and 7 discuss security and performance analysis of our scheme. At last, we give some conclusion in Section 8.
Preliminaries
2.1. Bilinear Pairing. Let 1 be a cyclic additive group of prime order and 2 a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order . We let denote the generator of 1 . A bilinear pairing is a map : 1 × 1 → 2 which satisfies the following properties.
(1) Bilinearity
where , ∈ 1 , , ∈ * .
(2) Nondegeneracy
(3) Computability: there is an efficient algorithm to compute ( , ) for all , ∈ 1 .
The Weil and Tate pairings associated with supersingular elliptic curves or abelian varieties can be modified to create such admissible pairings. The following problems are assumed to be intractable within polynomial time.
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem. Given , ∈ 1 , the task of CDH problem is to compute , where denotes the generator of 1 .
Formal Model of CLS and CLAS.
In this subsection, we will review the definition and security notions specified in [25] , only with slight notational differences. There are two kinds of adversaries in the CLS scheme and the CLAS scheme, that is, the Type I adversary A1 and the Type II adversary A2. The adversary A1 is not able to access the master key but he could replace public keys at his will. The adversary A2 represents a malicious KGC who generates partial private key of users. A2 could have access to the master key of KGC, but he is not able to replace public keys. The following are five oracles which can be accessed by the adversaries.
(i) CreateUser: Given an identity , if has already been created, nothing is to be carried out. Otherwise, the oracle generates the partial private key , the secret key , and the public key . It then stores the tuple ( , , , ) into a list . In both cases, is returned.
(ii) RevealPartialKey: On input of an identity , the oracle searches for a corresponding entry to . If it is not found, ⊥ is returned; otherwise, the corresponding is returned.
(iii) RevealSecertKey: On input of an identity , the oracle searches for a corresponding entry to . If it is not found, ⊥ is returned; otherwise, the corresponding is returned.
(iv) ReplaceKey: On input of an identity and a user public/secret key pair ( , ), the oracle searches for the entry of . If it is not found, nothing will be carried out. Otherwise, the oracle updates ( , , , ) to ( , , ,
(v) Sign: On input of a message for , the signing oracle proceeds in one of the three cases below. 
The security for a CLS scheme and a CLAS scheme is defined via the following two games separately.
Game 1.
The first game is performed between a challenger C and an adversary A ∈ {A1, A2} for a CLS scheme as follows.
(i) C executes MasterKeyGen to get master private/ public key pair ( ,
(ii) A can adaptively issue the CreateUser, RevealPartialKey, RevealSecertKey, ReplaceKey, and queries to C. (3) The oracle has never been queried with ( * , * ).
Definition 1.
A CLS scheme is said to be secure if there is no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A ∈ {A1, A2}, which wins Game 1 with nonnegligible advantage.
Game 2. The second game is performed between a challenger C and an adversary A ∈ {A1, A2} for a CLAS scheme as follows.
(i) C executes MasterKeyGen to get master private/ public key pair ( , ).
(ii) A can adaptively issue the CreateUser, RevealPartialKey, RevealSecertKey, ReplaceKey, and Sign queries to C.
(iii) A outputs a set of users whose identities are from the set * = { * 1 , . . . , * } and corresponding public keys from the set * = { * 1 , . . . , * },
. . , * }, and an aggregate signature * .
We say that A wins Game 2, if and only if the following three conditions hold.
(1)
* is a valid aggregate signature on messages { * 1 , . . . , * } under identities { * 1 , . . . , * } and the corresponding public key { * 1 , . . . , * }.
(2) If A is A1, at least one of the identities * has not submitted to RevealPartialKey queries to get the partial private key * . If A is A2, at least one of * has not been submitted to RevealSecertKey queries or ReplaceKey queries to get the secret key * .
(3) The oracle Sign has never been queried with ( * , * ).
Definition 2.
A CLAS scheme is said to be secure if there is no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A ∈ {A1, A2}, which wins Game 2 with nonnegligible advantage.
Review of Xiong et al.'s Schemes

Xiong et al. 's CLS Scheme.
In this subsection, we will briefly review Xiong et al. 's CLS scheme. Their CLS scheme consists of five algorithms: MasterKeyGen, PartialKeyGen, UserKeyGen, Sign, and Verify. The detail of these algorithms is described as follows.
MasterKeyGen. Given a security parameter , KGC runs the algorithm as follows.
(1) Generate a cyclic additive group 1 and a cyclic multiplicative group 2 with prime order .
(2) Generate two generators , of 1 and an admissible pairing :
(3) Generate a random number ∈ * and compute = .
(4) Choose cryptographic hash functions 1 : {0, 1}
* → 1 and 2 : {0, 1} * → * .
(5) KGC publishes the system parameters { , 1 , 2 , , , , , 1 , 2 } and key the master key secretly.
PartialKeyGen. Given a user's identity , KGC computes the user's partial private key = and transmits it to the user secretly, where
UserKeyGen. The user with identity selects a random number ∈ * as his secret key and computes his public key as = ⋅ .
Sign. Given a message , the partial private key , the secret key , the user with identity , and the corresponding public key , perform the following steps to generate a signature.
(1) Generate a random number ∈ * and compute = .
(
(3) Output ( , ) as the signature on .
Verify. Given a signature ( , ) of message on identity and corresponding public key : (
holds or not. If it holds, accept the signature.
Cryptanalysis of Xiong et al.'s Scheme
Shim [24] claimed that both of their schemes are provably secure against two types of adversary in the random oracle model. However, in this section, we will disprove their claims by giving two concrete attacks.
Attack against Xiong et al. 's CLS Scheme.
Shim [24] claimed their CLS scheme is semantically secure against Type II adversary. Unfortunately, it is not true, since there is a polynomial time Type II adversary A2 who can always win Game 1 through either of the following two attacks.
In Xiong et al. 's CLS scheme, the system parameters { , 1 , 2 , , , , , 1 , 2 } are generated by KGC. Let a Type II adversary A2 be a malicious KGC. Then A2 could choose a random and compute = , when he generates the system parameters. After that, A2 could forge a legal signature of any message.
(1) The Type II adversary A2 has the master key . Then, he could compute a user U 's partial private key = , where = 1 ( ).
(2) For any message , A2 generates a random number ∈ * and computes = , ℎ = 2 ( , , , ) and = + ℎ ⋅ ⋅ + ℎ ⋅ ⋅ .
(3) A2 outputs ( , ) as the signature on .
Since = , = , and = + ℎ ⋅ ⋅ + ℎ ⋅ ⋅ , we could have [24] claimed their CLAS scheme is semantically secure against Type II adversary. Unfortunately, it is not true, since there exists a polynomial time Type II adversary A2, who can always win Game 2 through either of the following two attacks.
In Xiong et al. 's CLAS scheme, the system parameters { , 1 , 2 , , , , , 1 , 2 } are generated by KGC. Let a Type II adversary A2 be a malicious KGC. Then A2 could choose a random and compute = , when he generates the system parameters. After that, A2 could forge an aggregate signature.
Let {U 1 , . . . , U } be an aggregating set of users with identities { 1 , . . . , } and the corresponding public keys { 1 , . . . , }.
(1) For = 1, 2, . . . , , A2 does the following five substeps to generate a legal signature ( , ) on a message . From the analysis in the above subsection, we know that ( , ) satisfies the equation ( , ) = (ℎ ⋅ + , ) (ℎ ⋅ , ), where = and = + ℎ ⋅ ⋅ + ℎ ⋅ ⋅ . Then we could have that
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Thus, we know that = ( 1 , . . . , , ) is a legal aggregate signature on messages { 1 , . . . , }. Besides, for any ∈ {1, . . . , }, has not been submitted to RevealSecertKey queries or ReplaceKey queries to get the secret key * and the oracle Sign has never been queried with ( , ). So the Type II adversary A2 wins Game 2.
Therefore, Xiong et al. 's CLAS scheme is not secure against attacks of the Type II adversary. 
Our CLS Scheme and CLAS Scheme
PartialKeyGen. Given a user's identity
, KGC computes the user's partial private key = and transmits it to the user secretly, where
, and = 5 ( , , , ). Verify. Given a signature ( , ) of message on identity and corresponding public key , consider the following.
(1) Compute 
Security Analysis
Security Analysis of Our CLS Scheme.
In this section, we analyze the security of our CLS scheme. The following lemmas and theorem are proposed. Proof. Given an instance ( = , = ) of the CDH problem in 1 , we will construct an algorithm C to compute , where , ∈ * and they are unknown to C. At first, C picks an identity at random as the challenged identity in this game, sets the master public key = , selects the system parameters = { 1 , 2 , , , , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 }, and returns the parameters to A1. Then C answers A1's query as follows. Finally, A1 outputs a tuple ( , , ) as its forgery, where = ( , ). If ̸ = , C stops the simulation. From the forgery lemma [27] , if we have a replay of C with the same random tape but different choice of 4 and 5 , A1 will output another three signatures. The following two equations hold since both of the two signatures are valid:
C looks up lists Analysis. We show that C solves the given instance of the CDH problem with the probability . To do so, we analyze the three events that result in C's success.
1 : C does not abort in all the queries of V .
2 : A1 can forge a legal signature = ( , ).
3 : the outputted tuple ( , , ) satisfies = .
From the simulation we know that Pr
, where 1 and denote the numbers of 1 queries and V queries separately. Then, the probability that C solves the CDH problem is
Then C could solve the CDH problem with a nonnegligible probability since is nonnegligible. This contradicts the hardness of the CDH problem. Therefore, our CLS scheme is existentially unforgeable against Type I adversary in random oracle model under the assumption that the CDH problem is hard.
Lemma 4.
If there is a Type I adversary A2 wins Game 1 with nonnegligible probability . Then we could construct an algorithm C to solve the CDH problem in 1 with nonnegligible probability.
Proof. Given an instance ( = , = ) of the CDH problem in 1 , we will construct an algorithm C to compute , where , ∈ * and they are unknown to C. At first, C picks an identity at random as the challenged identity in this game, generates a random number ∈ * as the master key, sets the master public key = , selects the system parameters = { 1 , 2 , , , , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 }, and returns the master key and the parameters to A2. Then C answers A2's query as follows. Finally, A2 outputs a tuple ( , , ) as its forgery, where = ( , ). If ̸ = , C stops the simulation. From the forgery lemma [27] , if we have a replay of C with the same random tape but different choice of 4 and 5 , A2 will output another signatures. The following two equations hold since both of the two signatures are valid: Analysis. We show that C solves the given instance of the CDH problem with the probability . To do so, we analyze the three events that result in C's success.
1 : C does not abort in all the queries of V -.
Then C could solve the CDH problem with a nonnegligible probability since is nonnegligible. This contradicts the hardness of the CDH problem. Therefore, our CLS scheme is existentially unforgeable against a Type II adversary in random oracle model under the assumption that the CDH problem is hard.
From the above two lemmas, we could get the following theorem. Proof. Suppose there is an adversary A ∈ {A1, A2} who could win Game 2 with nonnegligible probability. We could construct another adversary, who could win Game 1 with nonnegligible probability, through the method described in Theorem 2 of Xiong et al. 's work [25] . We have shown that no adversary could win Game 1 with nonnegligible probability in the above theorem. Therefore, our CLAS scheme is secure against adaptively chosen warrant attacks and chosen message and identity attacks in the random oracle model if the CDH problem in 1 is intractable.
Performance Analysis
In this section, we compare our scheme with two latest CLAS schemes, that is, Zhang et al. 's scheme [22] and Xiong et al. 's scheme [25] . For convenience, some notations are defined as follows:
(i) : the time for executing a pairing operation; (ii) : the time for executing a scalar multiplications in It is well known that security is a top priority in network communications. It is acceptable to enhance security at the cost of increasing computational time slightly. Therefore, our scheme is more suitable for practical applications.
Conclusion
Recently, Xiong et al. proposed an efficient CLAS scheme. They claimed that both of their schemes are provably secure in the random oracle model. In this paper, we propose a new attack against their scheme. To overcome weakness, we also propose an improved CLAS scheme and show our scheme is provable in the random oracle model.
